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The market for computer programs,' spawned in part by the
widespread popularity and availability of personal computers, has
generated an intensely competitive software industry.2 The relative
ease of copying software 3 heightens the need for software vendors
1 See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)) [hereinafter Copyright Act] (amending Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, tit. 1, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1980)). A computer program is defined
statutorily as a "set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a com-
puter in order to bring about a certain result." Id. Although the terms "software" and "com-
puter program" have been used to mean different things, see D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW
§ 2.06 (1990), this Note will use the terms interchangeably. See Fetterman, The Scope of
Protection for Computer Programs: Exploring the Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 43 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1373, 1373 n.1 (1986) (citations of cases using "software" and "computer pro-
grams" interchangeably). Computer programs can be divided into two general categories:
applications programs and operating system programs. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Frank-
lin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033
(1984). An application program usually performs a task such as producing spread sheets,
while an operating system program manages the internal functions of the computer in order
to run the applications program. Id.; see also D. BENDER, supra, § 2.06[2],[3] (discussion of
systems programs and applications programs); L. KUTTEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE: PROTEC-
TIoN/LIABmiTY/LAw/FoRMs §§ 1.01-1.07 (1987) (discussion of software and programming
techniques). Application programs and operating system programs are entitled to the same
protection under the copyright law. See Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1251.
2 See Kahn, Patent Protection for Computer Software, J. PROPRIETARY RTs., June
1989, at 7. It is estimated that the total market for computers and information processing
products will reach $200 billion in 1990, approximately half of which is attributed to com-
puter software. See id. An estimated 23% of the households in the United States owned a
personal computer in 1990 up from just 13% in 1985. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1990, at C1,
col. 1.
3 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 783 (C.D. Cal.
1983), afl'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). The "process of duplicating or copying a program,
once it is put into usable form in a ROM or diskette, is almost absurdly simple ... [since]
[d]iskettes can be copied for a minimal cost by anyone with rudimentary technical skill and
a few pieces of equipment, and ROMs require only slightly greater sophistication." Id.; see
also Forsten, It Walks and Talks Like My Duck, So How Come It's Not Infringement?: The
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to protect the proprietary interests in their programs by legal,4 as
Case Against "Look-And-Feel" Protection for Computer Programs, 70 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
639, 642 (1988) (programs easily downloaded from computer bulletin board via modem);
Savage, The Copyright Status of Typeface Software, COMPUTER LAW., Oct. 1989, at 6 (quot-
ing Formula Int'l, 562 F. Supp. at 783). It is estimated that in 1988 alone, over $1 billion in
revenue was lost world-wide due to piracy, and that 50% of all copies employed by users are
unauthorized. See Cangialosi, The Electronic Underground: Computer Piracy and Elec-
tionic Bulletin Boards, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 265, 273 (1989); see also L.
HABAND & R. SHELTON, PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE ch. 2 (1986) (ex-
tent of software piracy).
4 Patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and licensing agreements may be available as a
means of providing legal protection for computer programs. See generally D. BENDER, supra
note 1, at ch. 3 (summary of software protection); M. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY ch. 10 (2d ed. 1989) (discussion of protecting computer software through copyrights,
trade secrets, and patents); Maier, Software Protection-Integrating Patent, Copyright and
Trade Secret Law, 28 IDEA 13, 13-28 (1987) (same); Rodau, Protecting Computer Software:
After Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), Does
Copyright Provide the Best Protection?, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 527, 527-52 (1984) (same).
For an extensive discussion on the requisites of acquiring and enforcing a patent, see D.
CHISUM, PATENTS (1989). While the question of whether computer programs presented
proper statutory subject matter for patents was a controversial topic throughout the 1970's,
it is now well established that computer programs are not per se nonstatutory subject mat-
ter. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) ("a [patent] claim drawn to subject
matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathe-
matical formula, computer program, or digital computer"). See generally Bender, The Case
for Software Patents, COMPUTER LAW., May 1989, at 2 (analysis of patentability of computer
programs); Kahn, supra note 2 (same). The United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") recently released a report reflecting the judicially established guidelines for deter-
mining whether computer programs present statutory subject matter. See Patentable Sub-
ject Matter: Mathematical Algorithms and Computer Programs, 1106 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OF-
FICE 5 (Sept. 5, 1989). Nevertheless, due to the high cost and long delay of prosecuting
patent applications, and the likelihood that most computer program inventions do not rise
to the requisite level of patentability, patents may not be the best alternative for most pro-
grammers. See Rodau, supra, at 551.
State trade secret laws may also protect computer programs and have been used for this
purpose since at least 1965. See L. KUTrEN, supra note 1, at 4-2 n.1. The most widely ac-
cepted definition of a trade secret is promulgated in the Restatement of Torts:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of infor-
mation which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserv-
ing materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). See generally R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON
TRADE SECRETS § 2.09[5] (1990) (discussion of computer programs as trade secrets and cita-
tions of cases). But see Rodau, supra, at 534 (disadvantage of applying trade secret protec-
tion to software systems is difficulty of enforcement if programs widely distributed to
public).
Copyrights on computer programs first were registered with the United States Copy-
right Office ("Copyright Office") as early as 1964 under its "rule of doubt." See Oman,
Software as Seen by the U.S. Copyright Office, 28 IDEA 29, 29 (1987). Under this rule, three
conditions must be met to register a computer program: "first, the program had to contain
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well as extralegal,5 means. Although the primary legal issues in this
significant amounts of original authorship; second, it had to be published with the required
notice of copyright; and, third, if the work was published only in machine readable form, the
author had to deposit a human readable reproduction such as a printout." Id. (citation
omitted). While only three programs were registered in 1964, it is estimated that the num-
ber has increased to over 10,000 per year. See id. at 29-30. Recently, Congress amended the
copyright laws by enacting the "Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984" ("SCPA"),
which provides sui generis protection from unauthorized reproduction of original semicon-
ductor mask works. See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit.
3, § 302, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988)). A mask
work is essentially a series of related images etched in or added to a semiconductor chip
product so that each image resembles a part of the surface of the semiconductor chip prod-
uct. See 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (1988). While the copyright laws provide protection for in-
fringement of a program which may be embodied in "Read Only Memory", see infra note
25, the SCPA will protect the architecture of the ROM itself as embodied by its mask
works. See generally R. STERN, SmEACONDucTOR CHIP PROTECTION (1986). Thus, a pirate who
illicitly duplicates the mask works of a protected ROM embodying a copyrighted computer
program may be liable under the SCPA as well as relevant provisions of the copyright
statutes.
A program owner also may license the program and prevent the licensee from modifying
or using the program outside the scope of the license. See Raysman, Liability for Unautho-
rized Changes in Software, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 15, 1989, at 3, col. 1 (discussing S.O.S., Inc. v.
Payday, Inc., Nos. 88-5817 and 88-5878 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1989), holding that licensee prob-
ably committed copyright infringement when exceeded scope of license by making unauth-
orized modifications to software licensed by plaintiff-licensor); see also Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428, 1432-35 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (certain aspects of
defendant-licensee's visual displays not copyright infringement because of inclusion under
previous license agreement with plaintiff-licensor).
Shrink-wrap license agreements, which are miniaturized versions of a vendor's stan-
dardized licensing agreement, are sometimes included in the package of commercial mass-
marketed software, and purport to bind the purchaser to its terms. See Note, Offers Users
Can't Refuse: Shrink-Wrap License Agreements as Enforceable Adhesion Contracts, 10
CARDOZO L. REv. 2105, 2108 (1989). The purchaser usually acquiesces to the agreement
merely by opening the software package or by using it. Id. Thus, these licenses may prevent
software rental and the piracy it breeds by contractually prohibiting the transfer of
software. Id. at 2109.
5 See generally L. HABAND & R. SHELTON, supra note 3, at ch. 4 (discussion of technical
approaches to software protection). Many software vendors embed anti-copying devices in
the program's code which prevent the user from making subsequent executable copies of
that program. See Cangialosi, supra note 3, at 296-97. This practice may be questionable,
however, in light of express statutory authority stating that there is no infringement where
the owner of a copy of a program makes another copy for archival purposes. See 17 U.S.C. §
117 (5th Cir. 1988). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has held that a program enabling users to
"unlock" copy-protected software and make executable copies does not contributorily in-
fringe the copyright held on the copy-protected software, since permission to make archive
copies is granted by section 117(2). See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,
267 (1988). But see Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 9-10 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (§
117 interpreted to mean that certain media embodying programs are especially susceptible
to mechanical or electrical damage, and archive copies are permitted only for those media);
Micro-Spare, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35-36 (D. Mass. 1984) (archive excep-
tion not applicable to copying of programs which appear only in form of printed instructions
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area usually have focused on the scope of protection given to the
program's code,6 more recently, questions regarding the protection
of the computer user interface as an entity distinguishable from
the program have garnered attention.
The user interface generated by a program includes all the de-
vices by which the user can interact with the computer in order to
accomplish the tasks the computer is programmed to perform. 8 It
consists generally of the elements of the screen display, which in-
clude the particular arrangement of icons,9 menus,10 submenus,
windows, borders, and colors or levels of gray.1 Conceptually, the
user interface also may include the interaction of the input/output
hardware devices attached to the computer, such as a keyboard,
mouse,' 2 light pen,13 touch-screen,14 and the like." Although a gen-
in magazine).
An interesting recent approach to the problem of unauthorized copying has been for
vendors to offer amnesty programs in an effort to recoup revenue lost due to such piracy.
See Xtree Says Amnesty Program Is an 'Overwhelming Success', Infoworld, Nov. 13, 1989,
at 87, col. 4 (program allowed "unauthorized users to register their copies of the software
and become eligible for support and future upgrades").
I See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text; see also Rines, Computer Software: A
New Proposal for Intellectual Property Protection, 29 IDEA 3, 3 (1988) (criticism of existing
modes of software protection and interesting proposal for new protective legislation whereby
software developers would use "descriptors," or quasi-patent claims, to delineate
"innovations").
See Forsten, supra note 3, at 643-45.
S Computer Software and Copyright Protection: The "Structure, Sequence and Or-
ganization" and "Look and Feel" Questions, SOFTWARE PROTECTION, July 1989, at 13 [here-
inafter Look and Feel Questions]; see also Manufacturers Tech., Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F.
Supp. 984, 993 (D. Conn. 1989) (user interface designed to communicate with user in way to
facilitate understanding and use of program itself); Forsten, supra note 3, at 643 (user inter-
face consists of program which displays information on screen and requires responses and
input from user).
I See L. SCHWARZ, COMPUTER LAW FORMS HANDBOOK 9-336 (1989). An icon is a graphi-
cal representation denoting to the user a function which can be performed by its selection
on the screen. Id.
1* See F. WEIK, STANDARD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTERS AND INFORMATION PROCESSING 219
(2d ed. 1977) (menu display is list of options from which operator selects by use of input
device); see also Forsten, supra note 3, at 643 (menus present user with choices on screen
from which options or commands are chosen).
11 See L. SCHWARZ, supra note 9; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,
740 F. Supp. 37, 63 (D. Mass. 1990) (plaintiff's claim that user interface of spreadsheet
program includes menus, long prompts, screens on which they appear, function key assign-
ments, and macro commands and language).
12 See W. RosCH, THE WINN RoscH HARDWARE BIBLE 257 (1989). A mouse is a keyboard
alternative which basically comprises a pointing device that allows the user to choose a
menu selection by physically moving or dragging the device, thereby causing a correspond-
ing on-screen movement of the cursor. Id.
"' See id. at 264. A light pen is connected to the computer and contains a photodetector
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eral approach to the problems of proprietary protection of the user
interface would address such devices, the issues of legal protection
of the user interface heretofore have been confined primarily to
those of the screen displays.16
Proprietary protection of the user interface of a program may
be crucial to a software vendor's efforts to sustain a program's suc-
cess in the market. 17 A vendor's investment in developing a mar-
ketable program 8 by virtue of its "user-friendly" interface is sub-
stantial. Allowing a competitor to "knock-off" the original program
with the identical or a similar user-friendly interface at a lower
price may cause the original vendor substantial damage.
Accordingly, software vendors have turned to the remedies of
copyright law as a means of protecting both their programs and
the user interfaces those programs generate. 9 In addition to copy-
right law, at least one vendor has recently used design patents as a
means of protecting user interfaces. Design patents have been is-
sued covering certain aspects of screens generated by a computer
which senses changes in brightness. Id. By holding the light pen near a desired menu selec-
tion on the screen, the detected emission of light from the screen signals the computer
which particular item has been selected by the user. Id.
14 See id. at 265. Touch screens allow the user to simply point to, or touch, a desired
menu item on the screen. Id. One technology capacitively detects the presence of the finger.
Id. A second, more sophisticated technology, emits an array of invisible light across the
front of the screen. Id. When the user places his finger near the desired selection, the field is
broken, and the computer detects which selection was pointed to. Id.
" See, e.g., Manufacturers Tech., Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 995 (D. Conn.
1989) (user interface includes internal navigation: use of space bar, backspace key, and re-
turn key to move cursor through and select from list on screen).
"' See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
17 See F. COOPER, LAW AND THE SOFTWARE MARKETER 2 (1988).
18 See, e.g., Manufacturers Tech., 706 F. Supp. at 988 (approximately 3000 man-hours
expended in developing original program).
10 See F. COOPER, supra note 17, at 37-43. Copyright infringement cases concerning
user interfaces generally have been referred to as the "look-and-feel" cases. See Forsten,
supra note 3, at 643. The term "look-and-feel," however, is misleading and thus avoided in
this Note. While the term has been used generally to refer to screen displays of the user
interface generated by a program, it also has been used to refer to the structure and ar-
rangement of the program's actual code. See, e.g., Comment, When Technology and the
Law Collide-Look & Feel Copyright Evolves, 16 W. ST. U.L. REV. 183 passim (referring to
and defining "look-and-feel" as element of computer program). But see Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 63 (D. Mass. 1990) ("look and feel" is conclusion
of infringement analysis, rather than reason for finding infringement; use of term as in-
fringement test should be avoided); Note, The Test for Proving Copyright Infringement of
Computer Software: "Structure, Sequence and Organization" and "Look and Feel" Cases,
14 W a. MITCHELL L. REV. 105 passim (separation of look-and-feel issue).
1990]
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program.20 The issuance of these design patents raises questions
regarding the scope of protection design patents, compared to
copyrights, afford user interfaces.2 1
This Note will analyze the application of copyrights and de-
sign patents as a means of protecting the user interfaces and will
compare the scope of protection afforded by each. Part One will
discuss the previous applications of copyrights to protect computer
programs and review the early cases addressing user interface is-
sues. The current issue of the severability of the user interface
from its underlying program in infringement suits and the scope of
protection user interfaces have received recently also will be ex-
amined. Part Two will explain the application of design patents to
user interfaces by examining design patent law principles and re-
cently issued user interface design patents. Part Three will discuss
the doctrine of election. Finally, in Part Four, policy considerations
relevant to the issue of user interface protection will be reviewed.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF THE USER INTERFACE
A. Previous Applications of Copyright Law to Protect Computer
Programs
The use of copyrights to protect computer programs generally
has been proven to be quite successful. Courts have construed
copyrights to protect against the literal copying of the source code
as well as the object code of a program.22 Further, in the leading
21 See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
22 See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1230-31
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp.
741, 750 (N.D. IM. 1983). Source code is written by a programmer in a language such as
BASIC or FORTRAN, and then translated into machine readable object code, which is a
concatenation of ones and zeros. See id. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d. Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984), object code and
source code were found to be protectable by copyright. Id. at 1253. The Franklin court
entertained the suggestion that object code is not protected by copyright since it is in ma-
chine readable, and not human readable, form. Id. at 1248. The court considered the author-
ity of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo'Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), which held that a
piano roll was not a copy of the musical composition because it was in a form very few could
perceive. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1248. In finding that the Copyright Act obliterated such
distinctions, the court cited 17 U.S.C. section 102(a) ("copyright extends to works in any
tangible means of expression 'from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device'" (emphasis in origi-
nal)), and the definition of a computer program under 17 U.S.C. section 101 ("statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer." (emphasis by court)). Frank-
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case of Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc.,25 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
extended copyright protection beyond the program's code to cover
the structure and organization of the program when the code has
not been copied literally.24 Courts have found infringement of com-
puter programs regardless of whether the program had been copied
from Read Only Memory ("ROM"),25 floppy disk, or by hand.26
More recently, courts have held that programs in the form of
microcode are proper subject matter for copyright. Additionally,
tin, 714 F.2d at 1248; see also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 n.7
(3d Cir. 1982) (citing legislative history); Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Dis-
trib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 454 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (object code and source code protected).
2: 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
214 Id. Although the defendant's program was written in a different language and was
not a direct transliteration of plaintiff's copyrighted work, the district court found infringe-
ment due to the substantial similarity in structure and overall organization. Whelan Assocs.,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1321-22 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that "copyright protection of
computer programs may extend beyond the programs' literal code to their structure, se-
quence, and organization." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248. Whelan has been adopted in other
jurisdictions. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173 (9th
Cir. 1989); Digital, 659 F. Supp. at 449; Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning & Control, Inc.,
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,062 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1987). But see Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n
v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.) (declining to adopt
Whelan), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
Whelan has been criticized as giving computer programs patent-like protection without
having to pass the demanding tests of patentability, and with no demarcation of protection
as is found in patent claims. See Petraske, Non-Protectible Elements of Software: The
Idea/Expression Distinction is Not Enough, 29 IDEA 35, 53 (1988) (suggesting Whelan anal-
ysis may create "'zero threshold patent' having unlimited claims").
22 See Williams, 685 F.2d at 874-76. The Williams court rejected the argument that a
computer program is not infringed when the program is loaded into electronic memory de-
vices such as ROMs and used to control the activity of machines, holding that the statutory
requirement of fixation is satisfied through the embodiment of the expression in the ROM
devices. Id.; see also Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1249 (computer program in object code embed-
ded in ROM chip is appropriate subject of copyright); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669
F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982) (once stored in memory device, program is fixed in tangible
medium within meaning of Copyright Act); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (silicon chip is "tangible medium of expression"
within meaning of Copyright Act, making program fixed in that form subject to copyright
laws).
"e See, e.g., Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 36 (D. Mass. 1984)
(defendant's "typing service," which copied printed program code from plaintiff's copy-
righted magazine onto floppy disks for resale held to infringe).
2' See NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
Microcode consists of a series of instructions that tell a microprocessor which of its
thousands of transistors to actuate in order to perform the tasks directed by the macroin-
struction set, and therefore falls under the statutory definition of a computer program. Id.
at 1178. See generally Derwin, Microcode Copyright Infringement, CoMPUTER LAW., April
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in the first user interface cases, audiovisual screen displays of video
games were found to be protectable through copyrights.
B. Early User Interface Cases-Video Game Screen Displays
Issues of user interface protection first appeared in the context
of video games.28 Usually, video game screen displays were regis-
tered in the United States Copyright Office ("Copyright Office")29
as audiovisual works, 0 although some plaintiffs separately regis-
tered the underlying program code.31 The principal challenge made
1987, at 2-4 (technical explanation of microcode and discussion of NEC case).
The NEC court rejected the argument that microcode does not come within the defini-
tion of a computer program because it is part of the computer, and found nothing in the
statute to suggest a different result concerning copyrightability for different types of pro-
grams based upon the function they serve in the computer. NEC, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1179 (citing Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1252).
28 See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1009 (7th Cir.) (Pac-
Man and Galaxian), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Williams, 685 F.2d at 870 (Defender);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 479-84 (D. Neb. 1981) (Pac-Man). A
video game machine includes a cathode ray tube, a sound system, hand controls for the
player, and electronic circuit boards. Williams, 685 F.2d at 871-72. The electronic circuit
boards contain ROMs, which store the program instructions and data, and which interact
with the other game components to produce the sights and sounds of the audiovisual display
that the player sees and hears. Id. at 872 (citation omitted).
29 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988). The registration of a work in the Copyright Office is
prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright. Id. The defendant can rebut this pre-
sumption of validity. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 873. Prerequisites for copyright registration
are minimal. The work need not be new, but merely the original product of the registrant.
See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.5
(9th Cir. 1977). However, if the opportunities for originality are too limited due to func-
tional constraints, copyright protection may be denied. See Secure Servs. Tech., Inc. v.
Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp, 1354, 1363 (E.D. Va. 1989) ("mere rearrange-
ment of binary digits" within Tempest Facsimile protocol constraints uncopyrightable due
to lack of originality and authorship). The question of whether a work is copyrightable, and
therefore registrable, should not be confused with the scope of protection it is to be given in
an infringement suit. See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(infringement standards incorrectly used to determine issue of copyrightability).
30 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The Copyright Act defines an audiovisual work as
follows:
"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as pro-
jectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if
any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in
which the works are embodied.
Id. (emphasis added).
32 See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 610
(7th Cir.) (audiovisual display only for "Pac-Man"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Atari,
Inc. v. Williams, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 746, 746 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (audiovisual display only for
Pac-Man); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (audiovi-
sual display only for "Scramble" video game), afl'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
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to the copyrightability of the screen displays was that they were
neither fixed in a tangible medium of expression nor original works
of authorship, as mandated by statute.3 2 Courts considered this
reasoning, finding that the displays exhibited the requisite origi-
nality apart from the underlying program,33 and that fixation was
satisfied by permanent storage in memory devices such as ROMs.s4
Other unsuccessful challenges included contentions that a player's
participation withdrew the game from copyright eligibility because
the player was a "co-author, ' 35 that plaintiffs were attempting to
copyright utilitarian aspects such as ROMs,36 and that the plain-
tiffs failure to register the underlying program was fatal to the
32 See, e.g., Williams, 685 F.2d at 873; Stern, 669 F.2d at 853. Section 102(a) of The
Copyright Act provides, in pertinent part:
Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tan-
gible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include ... literary works...
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works ... motion pictures and other audiovisual
works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988); see also infra note 111 (discussion of "originality" requirement).
The Copyright Act defines "fixed" as: "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression
when its embodiment in a copy ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory du-
ration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
. See, e.g., Stern, 523 F. Supp. at 639 (while audiovisual display emanates from com-
puter program, display not necessarily unoriginal; audiovisual display, appropriate for copy-
right even if underlying program is not copyrighted).
3" See, e.g., Williams, 685 F.2d at 874 (statutory requirement satisfied, notwithstanding
defendant's contentions that transient images of game were not fixed); Stern, 669 F.2d at
855 (game's memory devices satisfy statutory requirement of copy in which work is fixed);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 479-80 (D. Neb. 1981) (fact that audio-
visual works could not be viewed without machine did not mean works were not fixed, de-
spite defendant's categorization of displays as "ephemeral projections on a cathode ray
tube").
1 See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (7th Cir.) (anal-
ogizing player to television viewer who merely changes channels, making no creative contri-
bution), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Williams, 685 F.2d at 874 (court disagreeing with
contention that player is co-author, stating that "there is always a repetitive sequence of a
substantial portion of the sights and sounds of the game, and many aspects of the display
remain constant from game to game regardless of how the player operates the controls");
Stern, 669 F.2d at 856 (player's participation does not withdraw audiovisual work from
copyright eligibility).
11 See, e.g., Williams, 685 F.2d at 874 (court refers to plaintiff's effort to protect artistic
expression in original works which have met statutory fixation requirement through embodi-
ment in ROM); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1008-09 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (court rejected argument that plaintiff was trying to copyright ROM, holding that
only copyright protection was sought on audiovisual aspects of game that appeared on
screen), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
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copyrightability of the screens.3 The courts' continued rejection of
these arguments leaves no doubt as to the validity of the audiovi-
sual copyrights of user interfaces generated by video games.
C. User Interface as a Separately Protectable Entity
Notwithstanding the unambiguous holdings in the video game
cases that display screens are separately copyrightable 8 and regis-
trable as audiovisual works,39 a California district court's decision
in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.40 sparked con-
siderable confusion in this area. In Broderbund, the plaintiff sued
for, inter alia, infringement of the audiovisual copyright it held for
screen displays generated by its "Print Shop" program.41 Although
the Broderbund court's finding of infringement was based on the
audiovisual copyright of the screens,42 it would appear that the
court, in dictum, misinterpreted and broadened the holding in
Whelan4" by equating computer program copyright protection of
the structure, sequence, and organization of a program with pro-
tection of the screen outputs. 44 Thus, the Broderbund court im-
plied that a copyright on a program may protect the screens it gen-
erates, notwithstanding the possible lack of a copyright on such
screens.
45
A Georgia federal court, in Digital Communications Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp.,46 declined to follow this
17 See Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. at 481 (relying on Stern, court held that lack of
copyright registration of program does not preclude suit to prevent infringement of audiovi-
sual work).
18 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Inl. 1983) (re-
jecting defendant's argument that video game visual display and computer program were so
intertwined as to preclude separate consideration, finding that two were distinct creations).
The Strohon court determined that it was possible to design a game that would infringe
plaintiff's audiovisual copyright while using a different program. Id. Similarly, the court
noted that it was possible for the program to infringe without the display infringing. Id.
" 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
41 Id. at 1129. Plaintiff's additional claims of textual copyright infringement, trademark
infringement, and unfair competition were not tried in this action. Id.
42 Id. at 1138.
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing Whelan holding).
See Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1133. "Whelan thus stands for the proposition that
copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer program, but rather
that it extends to the overall structure of a program, including its audiovisual displays." Id.
11 See Manufacturers Tech., Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 992 (D. Conn. 1989)
(Broderbund court misinterpreted and overextended reach of Whelan).
46 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). In Softklone, plaintiff held a copyright on the
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rationale, concluding that Broderbund overexpanded and errone-
ously interpreted Whelan.47 The Softklone court took the narrower
view that a copyright in a computer program does not extend to
cover the screen displays that program generates, and, therefore,
separate registration is necessary
41
The Broderbund and Softklone courts injected considerable
confusion into the debate over whether the user interface is a
copyrightable entity in and of itself, or merely an element of the
overall program. In response to these conflicting holdings, the
Copyright Office issued a notice stating that all copyrightable ex-
pression, including screen displays embodied in a computer pro-
gram and owned by the same claimant, is to be considered a single
work and, therefore, should be registered on a single application
form.49 As a result, it would no longer seem possible to register
main menu status screen not as an audiovisual work, but as a compilation. Id. at 453. The
court upheld the validity of the copyright and found that defendant's program infringed. Id.
at 465. The Copyright Act defines a "compilation" as: "a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship....
includ[ing] collective works." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
47 See Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 455. "The Whalen [sic] case did not stand for, as
Broderbund believed it to, the proposition that screen displays are protected by the com-
puter program's copyright .... Id. The court further stated that the "Whelan court did
not specifically extend a computer program's copyright protection to its screen displays." Id.
The Whelan court addressed the issue of screen displays and followed the precedent of the
video game cases, see supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text, by finding that screen dis-
plays are covered by separate copyrights. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244. "It is true that screen
outputs are considered audio-visual works under the copyright code .... and are thus cov-
ered by a different copyright than are [the] programs [creating the display], which are liter-
ary works." Id. (citations omitted).
The Whelan court did, however, state that similarity of screen displays is admissible as
evidence in a program infringement inquiry. Id. at 1244-45. Although completely different
(and therefore non-infringing) programs can generate the same screen displays, the fact that
there is similarity in screen displays has probative evidentiary value of similarity of the
underlying programs. Id. Screen display similarity is inferential, rather than direct, evidence
of program similarity. Id. at 1244.
Notwithstanding the criticism of its analysis in Broderbund, the District Court for the
Northern District of California recently reaffirmed its interpretation of Whelan. See
Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1993 (N.D. Cal.
1989) ("[c]opyright protection applies to the user interface, or overall structure and organi-
zation of a computer program, including its audiovisual displays, or screen 'look and feel'"
(citing Whelan and Broderbund)).
"' See Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 455. "The court.., concludes, consistent with those
cases finding the audiovisual screen displays of a video game to be separately copyrightable,
that screen displays generated by computer programs are not direct 'copies' or 'reproduc-
tions' of the literary or substantive content of the computer programs." Id.
" See Registration Decision: Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays, 53
Fed. Reg. 21,817 (1988) (single registration "covers" screen displays as well as program
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separate copyrights for both the program and the screen displays
generated by the program.50
Although the Copyright Office rule may be construed to mean
that the user interface is merely an element of the program, and
thus not capable of separate protection, a Connecticut federal
court in Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc.,51 inter-
preted the single registration requirement as creating the legal fic-
tion of accomplishing two interrelated yet distinct registrations:
one covering the program code and one covering the user interfaces
generated thereby.5 2 As such, there may be findings of infringe-
ment of the user interface notwithstanding the lack of infringe-
ment of the program code.53 This view is consistent with the reali-
ties of programming, since user interfaces can be cloned by writing
a completely different program.54 While similarity of interfaces
may evidence that the underlying code was in fact copied, such
evidence alone is not dispositive. 55 Thus, the approach of the court
in Manufacturers Technologies protects the user interface as a
separately copyrightable entity, while following the Copyright Of-
fice's procedure of allowing only one registration per work.
code). This notice is consistent with the regulations preferring single registration for a work
that contains discrete authorship components but is published as a unit, and permitting one
registration per work. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(3) (1989).
60 See Manufacturers Tech., Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 991 (D. Conn. 1989).
706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
52 Id. at 993. The benefits of this approach are threefold: (1) it allows the court to focus
on the copyrightable expression of each registration; (2) recognizes the fundamental copy-
right distinction between program and display screen; (3) conforms to the actual Copyright
Office registration procedures. See id.
" See id. In Manufacturers Tech., plaintiff held separate copyrights on the screen dis-
plays and the underlying program (issued before Copyright Office's single registration no-
tice). See id. at 988. The court held that defendant's screen displays "infringed the copy-
right of the screen display registration ... as well as the copyright of the screen displays
subsumed within the registration of [the] ... program." Id. at 1002. It is submitted, there-
fore, that the separate copyright on the screen display was not necessary for the finding of
infringement, keeping with the single registration analysis of the court.
64 See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (many dif-
ferent programs can produce same results); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741,
749 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (simple to design different program which produces same audiovisual
result).
11 See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244. Similarity of screen displays can be used as circum-
stantial, rather than direct, evidence to show that a party copied the underlying program.
See id. This is true even though many underlying programs can create the same screen
output. See id.; see also Comment, Proving Copyright Infringement of Computer Software:
An Analytical Framework, 18 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 919, 945-46 (1985) (suggests evidence of
substantial similarity of audiovisual sights and sounds should create presumption that un-
derlying program was copied).
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The analysis in Manufacturers Technologies may have been
unnecessary in light of recent statements made by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Atari Games Corp. v. Oman.56 In Oman, the Copyright Office re-
fused to register an audiovisual copyright for the screens generated
by Atari's "Breakout" game due to an alleged lack of originality, 7
yet suggested that Atari still could register the underlying com-
puter program.5 8 When Atari sued the Register of Copyrights, the
district court found no abuse of discretion.59 In reversing, 0 the
District of Columbia Circuit concluded that "registering a claim in
the program would not securely protect [the screen displays] for
which Atari seeks ... [a] copyright."'" Thus, the dual registration
rationale of Softklone appears to have resurfaced.62  Although the
Oman court did not expressly rule on the validity of the Copyright
Office's single registration requirement and its effect in an infringe-
ment suit, its conclusion that a program copyright will not protect
the screen displays certainly casts doubt on that procedure.63
Most recently in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback
Software International,4 the defendant argued that the Massa-
"a 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
57 See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 693 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 888
F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Atari received letters from the Copyright Office stating that the
audiovisual work presented "does not contain at least a minimum amount of original picto-
rial or graphic authorship, or authorship in sounds" and that "although independently cre-
ated, [it] does not contain enough original authorship to be registered as an audiovisual
work." Id.
58 See id. at 1206 n.6 (letters from agency informed Atari that being unable to register
screens did not prevent it from registering program itself).
11 Id. at 1208; see also id. at 1207 ("[i]n reaching its conclusion, the Register construed
both the Copyright Act, which it is entrusted to administer, and the Act's implementing
regulations ... [i]n this context, judicial review is particularly limited").
0 See Oman, 888 F.2d at 886. The D.C. Circuit held that the record on appeal lacked
justifiable reasons for refusing the registration of the screens based on lack of originality.
See id. Further, the court did not "grasp the standard of creativity the Copyright Office
employed" in its registration decision, and was concerned that the Register may have con-
fused or blended the question of copyrightability with that of a copyrighted work's scope of
protection in an infringement suit. See id. at 882.
01 Id. at 885-86 (emphasis added). The court also stated that it could not "convincingly
be maintained that audiovisual display and computer program are so linked that it is neces-
sary or sufficient for Atari to register a claim in the computer program [to protect the audio-
visual display]." Id. at 885.
02 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
13 See Copyright Office Must Explain Refusal to Register Video Game, 39 Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) 24, 26 (1989).
1, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
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chusetts District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 5 because
the plaintiff, Lotus, had not registered, copyrighted, or patented
the screen displays of its "1-2-3" spreadsheet program. 6 The court
acknowledged that Lotus attempted to register separately the
screen displays as audiovisual works but had been refused by the
Copyright Office, in keeping with its "one registration per work"
procedure.6 7 The question in Lotus was whether the user interface
of a program should be entitled to either patent or copyright pro-
tection, and the court answered this question in the affirmative.
In light of the preceding analysis, it is submitted that there is
a lack of consistent precedent on the severability of the user inter-
face from its underlying program. The Copyright Office will only
accept one registration on the program, which it asserts will cover
the screens as well." The District of Columbia Circuit has since
stated otherwise, although it is unclear whether that court consid-
ered or was even cognizant of the Copyright Office's recent posi-
tion. Regardless of the registration procedure ultimately settled
upon, it is submitted that it is essential for all courts to establish
that the user interface and its underlying program are separately
protectible entities in an infringement action in order to protect
fully the user interface, even where there has been no infringement
on the program itself.
D. Scope of Protection of the User Interface
The scope of protection to be afforded user interfaces in an
infringement action, remains a clouded issue. 9 While the law is
well settled regarding the copyrightability of video game screens,
which inherently are highly artistic and expressive, the separate
questions of copyrightability and the resulting scope of protection
to be afforded predominantly textual and functional works, such as
menus or status screens, remains unsettled.7 0 Functionally oriented
" See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988). Registration is a jurisdictional condition precedent to
filing an infringement action. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 79.
6 See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 79-82.
" Id. at 81.
8 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
69 See Forsten, supra note 3, at 643-44.
70 See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58. Judge Keeton attempted to formulate the copyright-
ability analysis of plaintiff's "1-2-3" program into three elements:
FIRST, in making the determination of "copyrightability," the decisionmaker
must focus upon alternatives ... along the scale from the most generalized con-
ception to the most particularized, and choose some formulation-some concep-
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textual materials alone, without audiovisual or graphic material,
are akin to factual works, which historically have received a nar-
rower range of protection. 1
In order to establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must
show both the ownership of a valid copyright and that the defend-
ant copied the work.7 2 Because copying is rarely provable by direct
evidence, it may be inferred circumstantially with a showing of ac-
cess and substantial similarity between the works.7 3 However, it is
the substantial similarity between the protected aspects of the
plaintiff's work and the defendant's work which must be proven,
and not just a showing of overall similarity.74
It is axiomatic that a copyright protects only the expression of
ideas and not the ideas themselves. 5 When defining the scope of
tion or definition of the "idea"-for the purpose of distinguishing between the
idea and its expression.
SECOND, the decisionmaker must focus upon whether an alleged expression
of the idea is limited to elements essential to expression of that idea (or is one of
only a few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable elements of
expression not essential to every expression of that idea.
THIRD, having identified elements of expression not essential to every ex-
pression of the idea, the decisionmaker must focus on whether those elements are
a substantial part of the allegedly copyrightable "work."
Id. at 60-61 (emphasis in original). Judge Keeton further opined that the decisionmaker
must perform an "evaluative or 'judgmental' weighing of all relevant characteristics of the
work in which a copyright is claimed, all relevant characteristics of the allegedly infringing
work, and all of the relevant circumstances of their development and use." Id. at 61. The
three elements are not an "all-inclusive list," but are the "principal factors relevant to deci-
sion of copyrightability of a computer program such as Lotus 1-2-3." Id.
While the test espoused by Judge Keeton serves as a good analysis of copyrightability,
it is unclear why the allegedly infringing work is considered a factor. It is submitted that the
allegedly infringing work be considered only in the infringement analysis, which would occur
only after the plaintiff's work has been deemed worthy of copyright protection.
7 See, e.g., Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 491
(9th Cir. 1985) ("copyright law considers factual works to be fundamentally different from
more artistic works: 'similarity of expression may have to amount to verbatim reproduction
or very close paraphrasing before a factual work will be deemed infringed"' (quoting Lands-
berg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1037 (1984))).
71 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162
(9th Cir. 1977).
73 Id.
7' Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988).
11 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). This principle has been codified in the
Copyright Act: "[I]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); see also Data East, 862 F.2d at 208 ("strong public
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copyright protection for a given work, it is essential to determine
which elements of the work constitute the protected expression of
an idea, rather than the idea itself.76 This analysis is usually not
black-and-white; rather, the elements in question exhibit many
shades of gray.7"
The accompanying doctrine of merger provides that when an
idea is indistinguishable from its expression, the two have
"merged" and the expression, therefore, is unprotectable..7  Where
the expressive features of an idea are a standard treatment of, in-
dispensable to, inseparable from, or necessarily follow from that
idea, such features are not protectable. 7° The scope of copyright
protection only extends to the protected work's artistic features;
not the utilitarian or mechanical aspects of the work;80 copying un-
protectable ideas does not constitute infringement, no matter how
similar the works may appear.""
It is, therefore, essential in determining the appropriate scope
of protection, to filter out the unprotected elements from the pro-
tected ones, and then to compare the copyrighted work with the
accused work.8 2 When text based menu and status screens are at
policy corollary to this axiom permitting all to use freely ideas contained in a copyrightable
work, so long as the protected expression itself is not appropriated") (citations omitted).
76 See Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163.
77 See Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 728 F. Supp. 597, 601 (N.D. Cal. 1989), afl'd, 916
F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990). The more expression a work is considered to have, the broader the
scope of protection will be. See Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1168.
78 See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir.
1971) (idea of jewel-encrusted bee pin indistinguishable from expression).
79 Data East, 862 F.2d at 208. The district court analyzed the copyrighted karate video
game with the accused work, and found certain features which were inherent to either the
sport of karate itself or computer restraints, to wit, the game procedure, common karate
moves, background scenes, a referee, bonus points, and computer graphics. Id. at 209. In
reversing the finding of infringement, the Ninth Circuit stated that the district court did not
give appropriate weight to defendant's arguments that similarities between the screen dis-
plays resulted from unprotectable expression, and the finding of protectable substantial
similarity was therefore clear error. Id.; see also Frybarger v. International Business Machs.
Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment of noninfringement where
similarities of video games at issue were unprotectable ideas and indispensable expression);
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.) (discus-
sion of scenes a faire doctrine, where "second author does not infringe even if he reproduces
verbatim the first author's expression, if that expression constitutes 'stock scenes or scenes
that flow [] necessarily from common unprotectable ideas'" (citations omitted)), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
:0 Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980).
81 See Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 741-42.
82 See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 67 ("court need only identify elements that are copyright-
able, and then determine whether elements, considered as a whole, have been impermissibly
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issue, what is important is not whether there is substantial similar-
ity in the total concept and feel of the works, but whether the pro-
tectable expression in the plaintiff's work is substantially similar to
the comparable parts of the defendant's work.8 3 Graphical and ar-
tistic works lend themselves to a broader analysis whereby the
work may be viewed as a whole. 4 What, then, are the protected
expressive elements of the user interface? Although there are no
bright-line rules, recent court decisions have shed light on some of
these protected elements.
Generally, when the computer hardware package with which
the program is designed to run constrains the manner in which
functions can be implemented and expressed, a copyright will not
protect a particular programmer's choice. Thus, in Manufacturers
Technologies, the court held that certain internal aspects of the
screen displays, such as using the space bar and backspace keys to
parse through a field of listed selections, are not copyrightable.8 5
Further, the Manufacturers Technologies court held that the use
of a screen format which is uniform throughout all the screens gen-
erated by a program is not copyrightable when the choice of for-
mats is due to logical placement of terms therein and limited by
the size of the screen. 6 As such, there can be no infringement,
even if the accused program deliberately adopts the plaintiff's for-
mat.8 7 For example, in Lotus, the court found that the number of
keys available to invoke the menu command system was easily lim-
ited, and thus not protected.88
The use of conventions which are standard or even common-
place in the computer industry have been held to be exempt from
copied") (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
" Cf. Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 491-93 (9th
Cir. 1985) (issue is "not whether there is substantial similarity in the total concept and feel
of the works... but whether the very small amount of protectible expression in [plaintiff's
work] ... is substantially similar to the equivalent portions of [defendant's work]").
See McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 321 (9th Cir. 1987) (limiting
Cooling Systems analysis to factual works and considering all elements, even unprotectable
ones, in artistic works); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th
Cir. 1970) (use all elements to compare works).
85 Manufacturers Tech., 706 F. Supp. at 994-96. The court warned that giving plaintiff
"copyright protection for this aspect of its screen displays, would come dangerously close to
allowing it to monopolize a significant portion of the easy-to-use internal navigational con-
ventions for computers." Id. at 995.
86 Id. at 994-95.
" Id.
e8 Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 66-67.
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copyright protection. In Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec
Corp.," copyright protection was refused for the use of pull down
windows in the plaintiff's outlining program for this reason."' Ad-
ditionally, protection was not afforded to the screen display fea-
tures which were inherent to outlining programs, including the
plaintiff's use of menu terms and functions performed.9 1 Further,
the plaintiff could not claim exclusivity of the use of a certain
color, since the rules of the Copyright Office specifically preclude
from copyright registration "mere variations of typographic orna-
mentation, lettering or coloring."'92
Under the doctrines of merger and scenes a faire,3 a limit on
the number of ways an idea can be expressed will limit the protec-
tion of such expression. 4 Thus, in Lotus, the court found that
there are a limited number of ways a computer screen could be
made to resemble a spreadsheet. 5 The use of a rotated "L," for
example, was present in most expressions98 and was therefore not a
protectable element.9 7
It appears, however, that while individual elements receive lit-
tle or -no protection due to their inherence or necessity in a partic-
:9 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
0o Id. at 1996.
91 Id.; see also Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807
F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.) (motion for preliminary injunction denied where similarities of
programs are due to external market constraints), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987); Ashton-
Tate Corp. v. Ross, 728 F. Supp. 597, 601-02 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (list of user commands not
protectable expression since many were common commands already available on other pro-
grams), aff'd, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990); Forsten, supra note 3, at 659 (basic commands,
error messages, and status messages may have limited range of clear, understandable
expression).
92 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1989).
1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1344 (6th ed. 1990).
A copyright law doctrine referring to incidents, characters or settings which are as
a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given
topic .... Such material, in an otherwise copyrightable work, is considered unpro-
tected by copyright because it would be natural for it to appear in works dealing
with similar subjects or situations.
Id.
:4 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
'9 Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 66.
9' Id. The court noted that while Lotus' "1-2-3" and its competitors' "VisiCalc" and
"Excel" (not at issue in this suit) shared the general idea of an electronic spreadsheet but
expressed the idea in substantially different ways, they all used a rotated "L" to make the
computer screen resemble a spreadsheet. Id. Thus, this shared element failed the second
part of Judge Keeton's test, see supra note 70, and was not protectable. Lotus, 740 F. Supp.
at 66.
" Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 66.
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ular type of program, the overall arrangement of the elements may
constitute protected expression. In Lotus, the court stated that,
when viewed in its entirety, the menu command structure, includ-
ing the choice of terms, their structure and order, and presentation
on the screen, was copyrightable.98 In Softklone, the court noted
that the use of a screen to convey program status, the use of a
command driven program, and the typing of two symbols to acti-
vate a specific command were all unprotectable ideas. 9 The court
found, nonetheless, that protectable expression existed in the ar-
rangement of program command terms on the screen, as well as
the highlighting and capitalization of two specific letters of the
command terms which are used to input the command.100 Simi-
larly, in Manufacturers Technologies, the sequencing and flow of
various menu screens generated by the program was found to be
protectable expression of the user interface.101
When graphical and artistic features predominate, the screens
are more likely to be considered as a whole. In Broderbund, the
court found that the screens had been created in light of primarily
artistic and aesthetic considerations, thereby rejecting the defend-
ant's argument that the utilitarian considerations constrained the
choice of expression.0 2 The court viewed the accused and pro-
tected works as a whole, finding infringement due to substantial
similarity of the works overall.10 3
Copyright protection, therefore, has been afforded to expres-
sive graphical representations, the arrangements of text, and the
sequencing and flow of various screens of the user interface.104
Courts have been particularly sensitive to denying protection
O8 Id. at 67-68.
1 Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 459.
'0' Id. The Softklone court held that the defendant's status screen was substantially
similar to the plaintiff's, as it captured its "'total concept and feel.'" Id. at 465 (citations
omitted). Although the court premised protection on a compilation copyright on the screen
which was registered prior to the single registration notice, it is submitted that such protec-
tion would be granted today to a similar screen whose copyright protection is derived from a
single registration on its underlying program. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
101 Manufacturers Tech., 706 F. Supp. at 994. The court held that the plaintiff's
screens, which guided the user through the steps of estimating the cost of manufacturing
certain products, embodied protectable expression notwithstanding the functional nature of
the cost-estimating process. Id.
"02 Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1134. The court termed the artwork as "aesthetically
pleasing," and stated that the total user interface provided a "significant element of en-
tertainment for the user (often a child)." Id.
100 Id. at 1137.
104 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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where functionality constrains expression. 105
II. DESIGN PATENT PROTECTION OF USER INTERFACES
A design patent may be granted for "any new, original and
ornamental design for an article of manufacture. " 0 While a utility
patent protects the functional aspects of an invention, a design
patent protects a product's ornamental aspects. 0 7 Ornamentality
requires that the design be of "aesthetic skill and artistic
conception. " 0
In order to be patentable, the design must pass the rigorous
test of being unobvious over the prior art.0 9 That is, a designer of
ordinary capability who designs articles of the type at issue must
be able to 'show that the design is not obvious in light of all known
prior designs.110 This is a much higher hurdle to clear than under
copyright law, which requires only that the work be original, not
:0 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
100 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988). Articles of manufacture are broadly defined as "anything
made 'by the hands of man' from raw materials, whether literally by hand or by machinery
or by art." In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1000 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (reversing rejection of design
patent application for water fountain, where design was formed by water moving in
fountain).
107 R. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 30 (1988). Utility patents are
granted for any new, useful and unobvious process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or improvement thereof. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1988). There also exists a plant
patent, which may be granted to anyone who invents or discovers, and asexually reproduces,
any distinct and new variety of plant. See Id. § 161 (1988). Most patents issued are utility
patents, which outnumber design patents by an estimated 10-to-1 ratio. See Kluth, Design
Patents: A New Form of Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software, COM-
PUTER LAW., Aug. 1988, at 1.
108 Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1961).
While the courts and PTO generally will not impose subjective taste when considering orna-
mentality, the PTO will reject patent applications "which disclose subject matter which
could be deemed offensive to any race, religion, sex, ethnic group, or nationality, such as
those which include caricatures or depictions." U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure § 1504 (5th ed., rev. Oct. 4, 1986) [hereinafter MPEP].
100 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). The patent statute provides in pertinent part:
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id. This statute is directly applicable to design patent cases through 35 U.S.C. section 171.
"The provisions of [title 35] relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for
designs, except as otherwise provided." Id. § 171.
"1 See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(design patent on microwave oven held unobvious in light of prior art).
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copied, and that the author himself generated it."' Furthermore, a
design that is primarily functional or dictated solely by functional
considerations is not proper subject matter for design patent pro-
tection. 1 2 This is analogous to copyright law, inasmuch as protec-
tion is not granted where functionality constrains expression." 3
The owner of a design patent has the right to exclude others
from making, selling, or using the patented invention for a term of
fourteen years, whereas copyright protection has a much longer du-
ration."1 4 Also, while a copyright defendant may be able to escape
liability by showing independent creation, an accused design pat-
ent infringer cannot."'
,1 See W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 18 (1986). Patry wrote:
[I]t has become firmly established in the case law that the requirement of 'origi-
nality' does not refer to a desired modicum of artistic merit, novelty, or 'nonobvi-
ousness' (as with patents), but rather to the origination of the work, viz., that the
work has been "independently" created, and not merely copied.
Id.; see also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 824 (11th
Cir. 1982) ("courts generally agree that 'originality' for copyright purposes is something less
than the novelty or [unobviousness] necessary for patent protection" (citations omitted)).
112 See Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1031 (1969); Hygienic Specialties Co. v. H. G. Salzman, Inc., 302 F.2d 614, 618 (2d
Cir. 1962). This is not to say that functional articles cannot have design patents granted on
their ornamental features. However, the features .upon which the design patent is granted
cannot be dictated by functionality. Barofsky, 396 F.2d at 342; see also Avia Group Int'l,
Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal. Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patents claiming ornamen-
tal design for athletic shoes held valid on summary judgment motion); Celebrity, Inc. v. A &
B Instrument Co., 573 F.2d 11, 13 (10th Cir.) ("decorative, ornamental, or design feature
was dominant over, and separate from, the functional aspects" (citation omitted)), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978).
' See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 57 (" 'functionality' of an article does not itself support
copyrightability"); supra notes 95-97, 105 and accompanying text.
114 35 U.S.C. §§ 173, 271 (1988). A design patent is infringed "if in the eye of an ordi-
nary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substan-
tially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to
purchase one supposing it to be the other." FMC Corp. v. Hennessey Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d
521, 527-28 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting Gorham v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871)).
5 See Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968), aff'd sub
nom. Blair v. Dowd's, Inc., 438 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham,
298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) ("[o]ne may infringe a patent by the innocent reproduction
of the machine patented, but the law imposes no prohibition upon those who, without copy-
ing, independently arrive at [that] which ha[s] been copyrighted"). "It is . . . elementary,
that an infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without knowledge
of the patent. In this respect the law of patents is entirely different from the law of copy-
right." Blair, 291 F. Supp. at 670. While intent need not be shown in a patent infringement
action, it may allow the plaintiff to be awarded treble damages and/or attorney's fees. See
Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (award
for treble damages and attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 285 upheld where defend-
ant infringed "knowingly, deliberately, willfully and wantonly" without investigation of pat-
1990]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:559
Recently, design patents have been issued to Xerox Corp.,
which cover icons representing functions used in conjunction with
computer screen displays.116 These icons are highly graphical, and
to the extent they are "ornamental," constitute proper subject
matter for design patents.11 7 Further, a computer screen upon
which the icons are embodied may properly be considered an arti-
cle of manufacture."" It is debatable, however, whether icons such
as these are dictated solely by functional considerations, which in
turn may preclude them from being properly patentable." 9 If the
use of such icons is found to be dictated by function, the validity
of the design patents may rest upon the extent of expressive
graphical qualities contained therein. 20
III. DOCTRINE OF ELECTION
Design patents protect similar ornamental and expressive as-
ent's validity or scope).
Since direct proof of copying is rare in copyright infringement cases, copying may be
inferred with a showing that defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that there is
substantial similarity between the works. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231-32; Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
116 See THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 1988 INDEX OF PATENTS,
Part I, List of Patentees 2962; U.S. Design Patent Nos. 295,630 ("Icon for user profile or the
like"), 295,631 ("Icon for dividers or the like"), 295,632 ("Icon for wastebasket or the like"),
295,633 ("Icon for PC emulation or the like"), 295,634 ("Icon for application program or the
like"), 295,635 ("Icon for icon editor or the like"), 295,636 ("Icon for loader or the like"),
295,637 ("Icon for broken document or the like"), issued May 10, 1988; 295,762 ("Icon for
physical floppy drive or the like"), 295,763 ("Icon font or the like"), 295,764 ("Icon for tele-
phone or the like"), 295,765 ("Icon for emulated fixed disk or the like"), issued May 17,
1988; 296,218 ("Icon for spelling dictionary or the like"), issued June 14, 1988; 296,339
("Icon for freehand drawing softkey display or the like"), issued June 21, 1988. These design
patents are believed to be the first relating to icons for computer screen displays.
" See Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1031 (1969). "In order for a design patent to be valid, it must be: (1) new, (2)
original, (3) ornamental, (4) nonobvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, and (5) not
primarily for the purpose of serving a functional or utilitarian purpose." Id. (citation omit-
ted) (emphasis added); see also supra note 112 (functional aspects of design .not
protectable).
118 See Kluth, supra note 107, at 4 (electronic reproduction of design on CRT no more
transient than design created by moving water in water fountain for which design patents
are permitted). Further, design patents have been issued on game boards, game cards and
character fonts. Id.
119 Id.
110 For example, the use of a telephone icon to represent the selection of a telephone
number look-up function on an icon-based menu may arguably be considered to be dictated
by function. See id. (analysis of functional considerations vis-a-vis expression of garbage can
icon).
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pects of a work as do copyrights, and both types of protection are
available to an author-inventor121 who meets the requirements pre-
viously discussed.1 22 Arguments have been made, however, that an
author-inventor must elect between copyright or design patent
protection when both modes are available, rather than enjoying the
benefits of both.12 3 The usual rationales offered by those who advo-
cate election of protection are that the methods of procedure, the
terms of protection, and the penalties of infringement are so differ-
ent that the author-inventor must choose one mode of protection
or the other. 24 Additionally, the term of a copyright is much
longer than that of a design patent,125 and thus it is argued that
the effect of a copyright is to extend the patent monopoly past its
expiration date. 2 '
In In re Yardley,1 27 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
addressed the doctrine of election issue and held that an author-
inventor need not elect between design patent and copyright pro-
tection.l2  The court found that overlapping modes of protection
could exist, and that it would be contrary to the intent of Congress
121 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The United States Constitution provides Congress
with the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." Id.
122 See supra notes 22-105 and accompanying text.
121 See Kline, Requiring an Election of Protection for Patentable/Copyrightable Com-
puter Programs, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 280, 281, 339 (Pts. I & II 1985).
24 See Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150, 152 (C.C. Pa. 1910),
aff'd on other grounds, 191 F. 35 (3d Cir. 1911), afl'd, 235 U.S. 33 (1914).
121 See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1988). A design patent is granted for 14 years. Id. A copyright
generally endures for a term consisting of the life of the author plus 50 years after the
author's death. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
126 See generally Kline, supra note 123, at 341. Once a patent expires, it cannot be
enforced so as to prevent the public from practicing the invention, which in the design pat-
ent case, would be the copying of the design. See In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1395
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (Commissioner of PTO argued when Supreme Court stated, in Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), "the [design] patent expires the monopoly
created by it expires, too, and the right to make the article-including the right to make it
in precisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public," it precluded allow-
ance of copyright on patented articles since copyright would deny public right to make arti-
cle); see also In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (held that one who obtained design
label copyright on certain hosiery ticket could not obtain design patent on same item, due to
extension of monopoly). Note that in 1927, copyright registration of commercial prints and
labels was handled by the Patent Office; this function was transfered to the Copyright Office
in 1939. See Kline, supra note 123, at 288 n.29.
127 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
128 Id. at 1394.
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to require an election. 12 9 Therefore, it is possible to secure both a
design patent and copyright on elements of a user interface screen
display, assuming that the statutory and procedural requirements
are met.130 It may in fact be essential to secure both types of pro-
tection because in the event a design patent on a particular ele-
ment is found to be invalid,' the copyright may provide backup
protection.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
There is a distinct tension between the policy of fostering cre-
ativity by granting proprietary protection to the creator of a work
and the policy of allowing others to use freely the ideas embodied
in that work.13 2 This holds true whether the protection granted is
129 See id. "Congress has not provided that an author-inventor must elect between se-
curing a copyright or securing a design patent." Id. The court found that although copy-
rights and design patents provide different protection for overlapping subject matter, the
mere fact that the copyright will persist beyond the term of the design patent does not
provide a sound basis for rejecting the design patent application. Id. at 1395.
'o See Id. at 1389; see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1989). It is incumbent that the au-
thor-inventor register the copyright prior to applying for a design patent, since current
Copyright Office practice provides that:
The potential availability of protection under the design patent law will not affect
the registrability of a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, but a copyright claim
in a patented design or in the drawings or photographs in a patent application will
not be registered after the patent has been issued.
Id. Further, when the materials submitted to the PTO in an application for a design patent
contain a copyright notice, the applicant must expressly waive his objections to "the facsim-
ile reproduction by anyone of the patent document or the patent disclosure.., but reserves
all other copyright rights whatsoever." MPEP, supra note 108, § 1512.
1 1 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988). Although an issued patent enjoys a presumption of va-
lidity, the presumption may be overcome by a showing by the accused infringer that the
patent has not met any one or more of the statutory requisites of patentability (e.g. unobvi-
ousness) and is therefore invalid. See Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802
F.2d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987). Invalidity must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
A copyright registration is prima facie evidence of a valid copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 410(c)
(1988), which can be rebutted by, inter alia, evidence that the "work was copied from a
public domain source or from other copyrighted works, [and] evidence that defendant pur-
chased a work identical to plaintiff's work before plaintiff's work was created." See W. PA-
TRY, supra note 111, at 185-88 and citations therein. While a design patent on a screen
display may be held invalid due to, inter alia, being obvious in light of the prior art, it is
submitted that a corresponding copyright will be upheld as long as the author's work is
original notwithstanding its obviousness.
1 2 See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237 (purpose of copyright law is to create balance between
protection and competition); Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 52 (copyright monopolies not granted
for purpose of rewarding authors, but to serve public welfare by encouraging authors to
generate new ideas and disclose them to public).
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through copyrights or patents; the substantive and procedural laws
have been shaped so as to strike the most equitable balance. It is
submitted that the issue of standardization is of paramount impor-
tance and should be seriously considered when analyzing the pro-
tection of computer user interfaces. As certain user interfaces gain
popularity due to their user-friendliness, they essentially become
de facto industry standards. Competing software packages will not
be successful in the market if they are too far afield from the ac-
cepted programs. It is impractical to expect consumers to master
the nuances and intricacies of a different interface methodology. 33
Although allowing competitors to obtain a free ride on the coattails
of a successful program may seem unfair,13 4 granting a wide scope
of protection to a de facto standard interface results in the grant-
ing of an arguably undeserved monopoly. 135 Moreover, the idea/ex-
pression dichotomy, which is so prevalent in software copyright
analyses, is further amplified when the expression seemingly em-
bodied in the screen display depends in reality upon the function-
ality of the interrelated hardware devices.
Aside from the early video game cases, most user interface
cases have focused on programs geared toward a specialized mar-
33 See Look and Feel Questions, supra note 8, at 14 ("user friendly ...implies a
market reality that a competing program will not be successful against an earlier entrant if
the second program imposes upon users significant costs of learning a new regime of keys-
trokes and commands"). The most common example of a standard interface is the ubiqui-
tous "QWERTY" keyboard, which gleans its name from the first six alphabet keys. See W.
RosCH, supra note 12, at 246-49. An alternative to QWERTY is the Dvorak-Dealy layout,
which has been tested to be more efficient. See id. The Dvorak-Dealy layout has never been
accepted, and since most people will not want to re-learn how to type, it probably never will
be. See id.; see also Forsten, supra note 3, at 661 (once initial time and effort expended on
learning to use program effectively, there is little incentive to switch to another competing
program if additional time and effort would be required).
It was recently argued by the defendants in Lotus that plaintiff's "1-2-3" program for
electronic spreadsheets had become a de facto industry standard for all electronic spread-
sheets, and that defendants' "V-P Planner" had to be compatible to be a commercial suc-
cess. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 78. The court countered this argument by citing Microsoft Cor-
poration's "Excel" program, which includes a translator capability, enabling a user to go
from "1-2-3" to Excel. See id. Thus, according to the court, companies are not necessarily
foreclosed from competing for "1-2-3" customers, notwithstanding allegations of "1-2-3" be-
ing a de facto standard. See id.
' See Look and Feel Questions, supra note 8, at 14.
See id. at 15 (analogizing copyright protection of de facto standard interface to
copyright on QWERTY keyboard); see also Forsten, supra note 3, at 640 ("[a]t stake is
whether software companies will be able to produce computer programs similar to market-
leading programs or whether large market-share programs will be able to dominate, and
essentially monopolize, the commercial computer software market").
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ket, although the analyses used should have general applicability
to any user interface infringement. Of particular significance is the
recent district court decision in Lotus, in which Lotus's enor-
mously popular "1-2-3" electronic spreadsheet program was found
to be protectable by copyright and the user interface was held to
have been infringed by the defendants' "V-P Planner.""1 6 On the
strength of this favorable ruling, Lotus immediately filed suit
against two other spreadsheet software publishers. 137 It is apparent
that Lotus's strength in the marketplace has been bolstered con-
siderably by the results of this case.1" 8
Other recent cases which have addressed user interface in-
fringement questions in relation to extremely popular, and perhaps
de facto industry standard programs, are Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft, Corp.13 9 and Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc.40
Both cases, however, did little to clarify this unsettled and highly
complex area of copyright law. The Lotus decision, on the other
hand, most likely will result in policy decisions having repercus-
sions throughout the software industry.
CONCLUSION
There remains uncertainty surrounding the legal protection of
user interfaces generated by computer programs. Copyright law
appears to be a powerful way of securing such protection. Never-
theless, the status of the user interface and the scope of protection
the user interface merits under traditional copyright doctrines are
not entirely predictable. Alternatively, design patents may provide
a means of protecting graphical aspects of the interface. However,
the usefulness of design patents in this area appears to be limited
due to the high threshold of patentability as compared to
131 See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 84. Most of the lengthy opinion exhaustively addressed
the issue of copyrightability of computer programs, since defendants admitted to copying
the particular elements which were ultimately found to be protected. See id. at 68.
3 See Lotus Sues 2 on Copyright Violation, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1990, at D1, col. 6.
I8 Id.
'39 717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989). In Microsoft, the plaintiff, Apple Computer,
claimed that Microsoft's Windows 2.03 and Hewlett-Packard's New Wave operating envi-
ronments infringed upon its copyrighted graphic user interface. See id. at 1429. The court
granted partial summary judgment on the infringement claim. Id. at 1435.
140 734 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1990). In Xerox, the plaintiff alleged that it, and not
the defendant, Apple Computer, was the true owner of the copyrights to various popular
graphical user interfaces employed by Apple Computer in some of its products. Id. at 1543.
The court found that plaintiff's allegations did not justify declaratory relief. Id. at 1547.
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copyrightability. Furthermore, the validity of design patents for
user interface elements has yet to be upheld in litigation. At least
one commentator has called for the enactment of special legislation
aimed at providing proprietary protection of programs. 141 Any fu-
ture legislation should also address the protection of the user inter-
face, and attempt to strike a balance between the safeguards that
will serve as an incentive for the computer software industry to
continue to produce quality products while ensuring the continued
free flow and use of ideas.
Anthony R. Barkume
141 See Rines, supra note 6, at 6-16.
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